Unwilling Actors: Why Voluntary Mediation Works, Why Mandatory Mediation Might Not by Smith, Gary
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 36, Number 4 (Winter 1998)
The Practices of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
Article 7
Unwilling Actors: Why Voluntary Mediation
Works, Why Mandatory Mediation Might Not
Gary Smith
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Special Issue Article
This Special Issue Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Smith, Gary. "Unwilling Actors: Why Voluntary Mediation Works, Why Mandatory Mediation Might Not." Osgoode Hall Law Journal
36.4 (1998) : 847-885.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol36/iss4/7
Unwilling Actors: Why Voluntary Mediation Works, Why Mandatory
Mediation Might Not
Abstract
This article examines the debate over the introduction of mandatory mediation in civil litigation. It analyzes
why and how voluntary mediation works in order to measure how the process might change under the new
regime being implemented in Ontario. The underlying narrative structures of mediation are exposed using
semiotic theories commonly employed in the study of theatre. This article will show that mediation, when
imposed on unwilling parties, will hinder its efficacy and compromise its theatrical processes. The author
concludes that the best way to ensure that making mediation mandatory does not discredit the efficacy and
benefits of the process is to encourage greater voluntary participation among members of the legal community
and their clients.
This special issue article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol36/iss4/7
UNWILLING ACTORS: WHY
VOLUNTARY MEDIATION WORKS,
WHY MANDATORY MEDIATION
MIGHT NOTO
BY GARY SMITH*
This article examines the debate over the introduction
of mandatory mediation in civil litigation. It analyzes
why and how voluntary mediation works in order to
measure how the process might change under the new
regime being implemented in Ontario. The underlying
narrative structures of mediation are exposed using
semiotic theories commonly employed in the study of
theatre. This article will show that mediation, when
imposed on unwilling parties, will hinder its efficacy
and compromise its theatrical processes. The author
concludes that the best way to ensure that making
mediation mandatory does not discredit the efficacy
and benefits of the process is to encourage greater
voluntary participation among members of the legal
community and their clients.
Le pr6sent article examine le d6bat sur la m6diation
obligatoire dans les litiges civils. En analysant pourquoi
et comment la m6diation facultative fonctionne,
l'auteur pr6voit de quelle fagon le processus changerait
si rendu obligatoire selon le r6gime que I'on met en
ex6cution en Ontario. Les structures narratives sous-
jacentes de la mediation se d6crivent par l'emploi de
th6ories empruntdes A la s6miotique th6atrale.
L'imposition de la m6diation I participants peu dispos
nuirait A son efficacit6 en compromettant ses procd~s
th~aItraux. L'auteur propose que ce n'est qu'en
augmentant le nombre de participants bien dispos6s
que l'imposition de la mediation ne ferait pas
d consid~rer ce processus utile.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The mandating of mediation for civil litigation pits proponents of
judicial expediency against the defenders of justice and fairness. This
article arises out of the debate in Ontario over the introduction of a
mandatory mediation program for civil litigation.1 There are proponents
and detractors of mandatory mediation, each with reasons why this kind
of program should or should not be implemented. Despite much
disagreement, which resembled a values-based dispute in which the
participants advanced their diametrically opposed positions, the concept
remained at the proposal stage for many months.2 The lessons of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) teach us to go behind such positions
to find the needs and interests of the parties. Only then can parties find
common ground upon which the issues can be reconciled.
The parties in this dispute did not discover common ground.
They disagreed on the basis of their irreconcilable positions, employing
separate discourses without a common understanding from which to
assess their divergent opinions. Although there was a sensitivity to the
oxymoron implicit in the juxtaposition of "mediation" with the adjective
"mandatory," none of the proponents or critics of mandatory mediation
approached the question from first principles in order to determine the
I Ontario, Memorandum of the Rules Secretariat-Consultation on Mandatory Mediation
(Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1997) [hereinafter Memorandum ].
2 See K. Makin, "Ontario Looks at Mandatory Mediation in Civil Suits" The [Toronto] Globe
and Mail (7 January 1998) A9. The program has subsequently been partially implemented. For the
details, see text accompanying notes 99-101, infra.
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possible consequences of imposing mediation. What was lacking in the
debate was a close analysis of mediation itself: a systematic, coherent
study of communications in the process of mediation. In order to
consider the issue of mandatory mediation in an informed manner, one
must understand not only what mediation can do, but how and why it
works. Once this has been accomplished, the consequences of
mandating what is generally considered to be a voluntary procedure can
be accurately predicted.
One aspect of the detailed analysis to which I have referred can
be found in a substantial number of books and articles which explain
how to practice mediation 3 Written by skilled mediators, these works
describe how to achieve results in the mediation process. Insofar as
these works focus on the steps in the process, they serve as "how-to"
guides for the practitioner, but they do not really consider why these
steps work. This "why" question is the very question posed by mediators
to parties in mediation in order to get behind their positions to find their
hidden interests. The answer to this question will tell us not only how
mediation works, but by going behind the mediator's moves4 during a
session, it will determine why it works. This is the essential first step in
the examination of mandatory mediation.
How can we determine why mediation works? I propose to
adopt the communication theory model used in the analysis of the
semiotics of theatre. In this way, mediation can be analyzed as theatre.
The mediator is writer, director, and actor in the proceedings. The
parties and their lawyers are actors who play their roles out on the stage
of mediation as guided by the mediator. On this stage they all become
characters in a drama whose conclusion is the settlement-or perhaps
non-settlement-of the dispute. This metaphor permits the application
of semiotic theories of theatre communication to show not only how
mediation works, but to suggest as well why the process works.S
3 There are a great number of these instructional and educational references. Only a
sampling, including those which have been considered in this article, will be cited here: see C.W.
Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, 2d ed. (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1996); J.B. Stulberg, Traking ChargelManaging Conflict (New York: Lexington Books,
1987); S.B. Goldberg, F.E.A. Sander & N.H. Rogers, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and
Other Processes (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1992); and J. Folberg & A. Taylor, Mediation: A
Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without Litigation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984).
4 The mediator's moves are defined by Christopher Moore as those techniques employed by
the mediator to assist the parties: see Moore, supra note 3 at 56.
5 See D.A. Kolb, "To Be a Mediator: Expressive Tactics in Mediation" (1985) 1 J. Soc. Issues
11. Kolb employs the theatre metaphor in describing the mediator's moves in assisting the parties
to mediation but does not analyze the semiotics of mediated communication. See also J.W. Cooley,
1998]
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Having built a model illustrating voluntary mediation to serve as
the control for this analysis, a model of mandatory mediation will be
developed to demonstrate how the motivations of the participants
produce different outcomes under each model. Further analysis will
determine what these differences imply concerning the operation of
mandatory mediation and why it might or might not work.
To ensure that the control-the voluntary mediation model-is
neutral concerning those aspects of the Ontario debate that are not
directly related to the voluntary/mandatory dichotomy, it will resemble
the existing mandatory mediation regime in certain respects. 6 It will
therefore assume that mediation is voluntarily held at the same point in
the litigation as it would be under the mandatory program. Likewise,
mediation will be defined and studied in accordance with one of the
main "how-to" authorities in the field, Christopher Moore, following his
seminal work The Mediation Process.7
The preliminary hypothesis is that mandatory mediation will not
operate in the same way as its voluntary form-contrary to the
suggestions of other writers on this subject, it might not work at all.8 I
will test this hypothesis by the means outlined above.
II. THE VOLUNTARY MEDIATION MODEL
As indicated, the voluntary mediation model I will develop in
this article will mirror the mandatory mediation model under the
Ontario regime. 9 The mediation session would commence ninety days
"Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse" (1997) 29 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1. Cooley employs the metaphor
of the performing magician to account for various tricks of perception that deceive mediating
parties.
6 The elements of the Ontario rule that will be incorporated into the control will be described
in Part I1, below.
7 Moore, supra note 3.
8 Other scholars have raised concerns about the effectiveness of mandatory mediation: see, in
particular, C. Menkel-Meadow, "Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-opted or 'The Law of ADR' (1991) 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1. There are a range of
concerns about mandating mediation. Some prefer to guarantee judicial safeguards for litigants:
see 0. Fiss, "Against Settlement" (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073; and G.T. Eisele, "The Case Against
Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR Programs" (1991) 75 Judicature 34. Others identify the problems
of coercion and power imbalances in mandatory mediation: see J.J. Alfini, "Trashing, Bashing and
Hashing it Out: Is This the End of 'Good Mediation'?" (1991) 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 47; R. Ingleby,
"Court Sponsored Mediation: The Case Against Mandatory Participation" (1993) 56 Mod. L. Rev.
441; and T. Grillo, "The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women" (1991) 100 Yale L.J.
1545.
9 Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 as am. by 0. Reg. 453/98, r. 24.1.
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after the first defence is filed in an action.lO The parties would therefore
be represented by counsel in a lawsuit. The parties and their lawyers are
required to attend mediation sessions,' Ibut counsel would undoubtedly
attend any way. If one or both parties does not attend12 or file a
statement of issues with documents necessary to inform the mediator of
the nature of the matter, the mediator files a certificate of non-
compliance.13 If the Case Management Master or Judge invokes them,
penalties for non-compliance range from the imposition of a timetable
for the action, through striking of documents, including the defence,
dismissal of the action, costs sanctions, or any other order that is just.14
There is a provision for exemptions15 or postponement1 6 of the session,
but for the purposes of this study it will be assumed that the substantial
penalties or court appearances involved would compel the mediation to
take place as and when intended, immediately after the close of the
pleadings. The dispute will therefore have crystallized into its legalistic
form as a dispute over rights enforceable at trial by judgment. In order
to simplify the model, I will assume litigation involves one plaintiff and
one defendant, each represented by counsel.
The communication model that is produced by this litigation can
be shown in a standard semiotic square 17 set out as Fig. 1.18 The initial
bargaining relationship between the disputants A and B, with its single
route (horizontal line 1) running between them, is expanded into a
square with the addition of their counsel. Communication between A
10 Ibid. r. 24.1.09(1).
11 Ibid. r. 24.1.11(1).
12 Ibid. r. 24.1.10, 24.1.12
13 Ibid. r. 24.1.13.
14 Ibid. r. 24.1.13(2).
15 Ibid. r. 24.1.05.
16 Ibid. r. 24.1.09(1).
17 Algirdas Greimas created the basic semiotic square for the study of literature: see A.J.
Greimas, Du sens: essais sniotiques (Paris: t-ditions du Seuil, 1970) at 135-55 [hereinafter Du sens].
His square has been applied to the study of a statute by A.J. Greimas & E. Landowski, "Analyse
stimiotique d'un discoursjuridique: la loi commerciale sur les soci6tds et les groupes de soci6t6s" in
A.J. Greimas, Smiotique et sciences sociales (Paris: ditions du Seuil, 1976) 79, and subsequently
applied to the study of law in general by B.S. Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory, reprint (London:
Deborah Charles, 1997) at 80ff. The semiotic square used in Fig. I is suggested by Jeffrey Rubin
and Frank Sander, who employ a similar model to illustrate communication in representative
negotiation: see J.Z. Rubin & F.E.A. Sander, "When Should We Use Agents? Direct vs.
Representative Negotiation" (1988) 4 Negotiation J. 395 at 395-96.
18 See Appendix, Fig. 1, below.
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and B will now cease to run along line 1, the top side of the square, and
will pass only through and between counsel making the trip along the
other three sides. The contribution of the semiotic square to this
analysis is in its additional description of the corners of the squares and
their relationships to one another. There are three relationships: the
horizontal lines I and 4 indicate a relationship of contrariety; the vertical
lines 2 and 3 a relationship of implication; the diagonal lines running
through the centre of the square indicate a relationship of
contradiction. 9 These relationships show very well how communication
is dictated by the litigation structure. Although adopting contrary
positions, parties A and B were able to negotiate until the time that the
litigation began. Communication between them was only cut off by the
ethical tradition of the adversary system, which prohibits communication
between the litigants once they are represented by lawyers. Though
likewise contrary in position, lawyers continue the negotiations on behalf
of the parties.20 The relationship between principal and agent is shown,
on each side of the square, as the vertical line of implication connecting
counsel to party. Communication between the lawyer and the client is
implied; communication between party A and party B's counsel,
however, or party B and party A's counsel, is .contradicted by their
relationships. B's lawyer may not communicate directly with A. In fact,
the contradictory relationship is emphasized by the major feature of
communication between counsel and the opposing party-cross-
examination-which is an attempt not to communicate with the
opposing party, but rather to disprove or contradict what the other party
has stated.
What one notices immediately about this model is the rigidity of
the roles, ranging from prohibition through implication, contrariety, and
contradiction, all centered on establishing and advancing rights issues set
out in the litigation. The litigation model does not enhance
communication. On the contrary, it forbids communication, ensuring
that it is only contrary or contradictory and therefore negative, and
restricting it to pre-established categories of rights at issue in the court
19 See Jackson, supra note 17 at 88, 96.
20 Counsel for A and B can also be described by what they are not. A's counsel is not party B.
This confirms the basic semiotic relationship of contradiction between the occupants of tie
diagonally opposite corners of the square: see Du sens, supra note 17 at 137. Bernard Jackson has
observed that the relationship between A and B is comparable to that between their counsel, but
that the relationships are not logically equivalent: see Jackson, supra note 17 at 88. Though it
exceeds the scope of the present study, the lack of equivalence which arises from the differing
motivations of the two relationships of contrariety, and which influences communication in the
model, merits further exploration.
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documents. The parties create their own alternative discourses. They
do not so much speak to each other as speak about themselves and
against their adversary.
The parties might seek to change this dynamic by engaging a
mediator. The nature of mediation is described in the Ontario rule as
follows: "In mediation, a neutral third party facilitates communication
among the parties to a dispute, to assist them in reaching a mutually
acceptable resolution."2' The process of mediation itself is not further
described. The mandatory regime is limited to prescribing the process of
facilitating communication for the purpose of producing a resolution.
Only these two purposes will be examined in the model of voluntary
mediation; I will assume the parties have no ulterior goals for
participating in mediation.22
The facilitation of communication is necessary due to the severe
restrictions imposed by the adversarial litigation system. Resolution
serves the purposes of the project itself to "reduce cost and delay in
litigation." 2 3 Finding a "fair and early resolution"2 4 may not be
important to all litigants, but in our hypothetical voluntary mediation
this is likely the reason why the parties would seek mediation. Let us
turn now to the mediation model and its pragmatics in terms of the
available means of resolving disputes.
III. MEDIATION AS ENHANCED COMMUNICATION
A more detailed definition of mediation than that provided in
the Ontario regime is now required. Moore states that
mediation is generally defined as the intervention in a negotiation or a conflict of an
acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power but
who assists the involved parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement
of issues in dispute.2 5
21 Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, r. 24.1.02.
22 For discussion of the many possible ulterior motives for mediating, see the articles cited
supra note 8. These include oppression of a susceptible party, delay of justice, increase of expense,
information hunting, coercion of a settlement, and concealment of detrimental facts by resolving the
matter prior to the completion of formal discovery procedures, amongst many others. Ulterior
motives are limited only by human creativity.
23 Rules of Civil Procedure,supra note 9, r. 24.1.01.
24 Ibid.
25 Moore, supra note 3 at 15 [emphasis omitted].
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The mediator ... works to reconcile the competing interests of the two parties. The
mediator's task is to assist the parties in examining their interests and needs and in
negotiating an exchange of promises and the definition of a relationship that will be
mutually satisfactory and will meet the parties' standards of fairness. 26
[Mediation is] a voluntary process .... Voluntaty refers to freely chosen participation and
freely made agreement. 2 7
The last quotation shows that Moore considers the concept of
voluntariness to be so essential to mediation, both at the entry and at the
agreement stages, that he includes it in the definition of the process. The
other two points require deeper examination for my purposes. In the
Ontario rule, the mediator is a communication facilitator who, according
to Moore's definitions, "intervenes" and "assists" the parties for the
purpose of reaching a settlement. This is done by reconciling
"competing interests" and "needs." In our model, therefore, we are
considering a voluntarily undertaken, interests- and needs-based
intervention through the facilitation of communication in a rights-based
dispute environment. This intervention will attempt to assist the parties
to reach a voluntary resolution of their dispute. The mediation can be
best illustrated by adding to our previous model. Figure II shows the
communication model when it becomes a voluntary mediation.28
William Ury, Jeanne Brett, and Stephen Goldberg describe the
three possible approaches to the resolution of disputes as power, rights,
and interests, which they illustrate with three concentric circles:
The innermost circle represents interests; the middle, rights; and the outer power. The
reconciliation of interests takes place within the context of the parties' rights and power.
The likely outcome of a dispute if taken to court or to a strike, for instance, helps define
the bargaining range within which a resolution can be found. Similarly, the
determination of rights takes place within the context of power. One party, for instance,
may win a judgment in court, but unless the judgment can be enforced, the dispute will
continue. Thus, in the process of resolving a dispute, the focus may shift from interests to
rights to power and back again.29
This kind of shift occurs when the parties in our model choose
interest-based mediation in the context of rights-based litigation.
Mediation takes place entirely within the interests circle, while the
parties and counsel retain their positions on the inner edge of the rights
zone, where it borders on the interest circle, due to the shape of the
26 Ibid. at 18.
2 7 bid at 19 [emphasis in original].
28 See Appendix, Fig. I1, below.
29 W.L. Ury, J.M. Brett & S.B. Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut
the Costs of Conflict (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988) at 9 [hereinafter Getting Disputes Resolved].
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semiotic square. Rights are seldom entirely abandoned in mediation;
they are frequently referred to in considering the parties' BATNA (Best
Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement) 3 0 since litigation is the
immediate alternative to a negotiated agreement. The mediator (M in
Fig. II), who is selected by both parties and their counsel, is positioned
entirely within the interests circle; by virtue of their neutral role as
facilitator, they must stand in the direct centre of both the circle and the
square. In this position, the mediator is equidistant from the parties and
their counsel at the intersection of the diagonal lines of contradiction
running from A to B's counsel, and from B to A's counsel.
The position of the mediator inside the communication square
and entirely within the interests circle underscores the mediator's
median position in all respects. The mediator can speak with all four
participants who in turn, by speaking to the mediator, can communicate
indirectly with the other participants, who will "overhear" whatever is
said. Indeed, the mediator's presence at the intersection permits the
lines of contradiction to be broken and allows A's counsel not only to
hear what B will say, but permits A's counsel to speak directly to B in an
non-contradictory manner without breaching ethical rules. Likewise, A
and B will not only overhear what the other says, but will be able to
speak directly to one another again.
Will this enhanced communication lead to agreement? Listening
and hearing are important elements in the process. When one person
speaks in a mediation session, the others will be listening and may
therefore hear things that draw them closer to an agreement. The word
for an agreement, "entente," comes from the French verb entendre,
meaning not to speak or to listen, but to hear, and therefore to
understand. The participants' capacity to hear and understand, and not
their propensity to build their position by tearing down their opponent's,
permits agreement to emerge in an interest-based process.
Communication is not defined as much by what is said as by what is
received. The meaning of any discourse lies primarily in the ability of
the recipient to decode the message, and in the interpretation that is
subsequently given to it. What is said is only "virtual" communication:
reception and comprehension of the message actualize the transfer.
Mediation promotes communication and increases the chance that the
message will come through clearly, with the same meaning for both
parties. This is due to the openness of the communication environment
and its basis in the underlying interests, rather than the parties' adopted
30 R. Fisher & W. Ury, with B. Patton, ed., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving In, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991) at 100 [hereinafter Getting to Yes].
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positions, which might otherwise obscure their real motivations.
Likewise, by installing a single interlocutor in the place of two others, the
long journey around the three edges of the square is short-circuited,
decreasing the likelihood that the message will be distorted in transit,
and enhancing the possibility that the interpretation will coincide with
the speaker's intention.
These enhancements of communication, which show how
mediation works, do not, by themselves, explain why mediation works.
Why would communication, liberated by the introduction of a neutral
third party, suddenly result in agreements? Why would parties not
entrust their representation at mediation to the counsel that they are
paying, in any event, to attend the mediation? They are, after all, the
paid spokespersons of the parties whom the latter have chosen for their
persuasive skills. Liberating communication does not necessarily mean
that the two discourses can be reconciled. Something else must happen
to unite them. Why do two opposed discourses become one? To answer
these "why" questions, I must turn to the analysis of mediation as
theatre.
IV. MEDIATION AS THEATRE
Theatre is an art in which the participants, playing roles created
by an author and guided by a director, create a story. The variations on
this basic premise are endless, ranging from the recreation of real events,
to the creation of fiction, to the "happenings" of the 1970s which lacked
script, plot, and direction. At the heart of each is the role-playing
concept.3 1 It is in this respect that theatre and mediation are most alike.
The parties in mediation are asked to play a role different from the one
they play in litigation. They act out a play which, because it is not
determinative of their rights in the litigation, allows them considerable
freedom to perform their part. Of course, they may be reluctant to put
their full effort into this play, but the mediator, whom they have chosen
to assist them, acts as the writer, director, and one of the central
characters in the play. Mediators will encourage the players to throw
themselves into their roles to achieve the maximum result. For this,
mediators have an array of procedures at their disposal to encourage full
participation. Their presence at all phases of the mediation to supervise
the performance and to correct the players, the script, and even their
31 See A. Ubersfeld, L'cole du spectateur lire le thidtre 2 (Paris: tditions sociales, 1981) at 9.
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own contribution, is critical to the success of the process. The mediator's
specific moves will be discussed below.
The status of mediation as non-final is itself the mediator's most
valuable tool. The parties can walk away at any time and need not agree
to any deal which they do not think is in their best interests. In essence,
the mediation doesn't count as reality; it is a hypothetical exercise, like a
play. Edward De Bono uses the term "Po" to introduce any statement
that is made to provoke a different way of thinking.32 It is drawn from
the common syllable in words such as "hypothetical," "possible,"
"potential," "poetry," and "suppose," 33 which also describe the nature of
theatre. It is the art form of pretending and creating the possible.
Mediation is likewise conducted entirely in the realm of Po. There is
nothing final in mediation until a written agreement is signed, and that
only happens at the conclusion of the process. Free thinking and the
exploration of options is central to a process which is intended to
develop a solution that provides greater gains to both parties than the
losses they might suffer in order to resolve the dispute. This is the
win/win integrative settlement possibility inherent in the exploration of
interests, as opposed to the assertion of rights and the adoption of
limited positions. Positions must be sacrificed to reach a compromise in
a distributive settlement of the dispute, creating a win/lose perception of
the resolution.34
The comparison of theatre and mediation is open to the criticism
that the latter, unlike the former, has no audience. Theatre, however,
often has no audience but the players. Society theatre of the 18th
century in France was often written for and acted by the members of
social circles who would put on the play themselves for their own
amusement.3S Their appreciation of the performance was not impaired
by their presence on stage, where they enjoyed the performances of
others. One might argue that the effect for the performer is even
stronger than for a detached audience. In fully assuming their roles, the
participants might gain a greater understanding of themselves and of
their opposite numbers than might a passive audience. In mediation, the
parties play not only for each other, but also for the mediator, whom
they see as outside the dispute although the mediator is, in fact, inside
the mediation process. In this way the mediator is able to serve as the
32 E. De Bono, Teach Yourself to Think (London: Penguin, 1996) at 131.
33 Ibid.
34 See Getting to Yes, supra note 30, c. 3.
35 See J. Curtis & D. Trott, Histoire et recueil des Lazzis (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1996).
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audience while still maintaining control of and participation in the
process. 36
A. Denial
Some theories developed for the analysis of theatre can be
applied to mediation. The first of these is denial.37 When we see a play,
we are captured by it. Through our identification with the characters, we
believe that the action is real while denying the absolute reality of the
play. Nevertheless, the most effective moments come when we suspend
disbelief in its reality. In mediation, the parties are able to consider the
entire procedure as purely hypothetical and non-binding. But there will
be moments when they are captured by the reality of the performance
and contribute without the "second thought" of denial. These will also
be the most successful moments in the mediation. There are real
possibilities for change when the hypothetical is confused with the real.
B. Distancing
Similarly, the concept of the distancing 38 of a theatrical
presentation contributes to the success of mediation. We distance
ourselves from the theatrical performance, particularly its less pleasant
aspects, by reminding ourselves that it is just a play. This permits us
latitude that we could not tolerate in reality. The horror genre is an
excellent example of this process in operation. What we could not
accept in reality we are willing to tolerate in the theatre because we are
able to say that it is not real. This same concept applies to mediation.
Because the process is not real in the sense of binding the rights of the
parties, the participants will allow much more serious discussion of
needs and interests. Their belief that the mediation will be
unenforceable against them in the real world-that the entire mediation
and its consequences will disappear when the process ends-allows them
to distance themselves from the consequences of open participation.
36 Although some might take exception to my use of this metaphor, namely that theatre is not
used to resolve disputes, many plays in fact do just that. They represent the moment of resolution
of a conflict that introduces a new social order. See generally N. Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four
Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
37 See P. Pavis, Dictionnaire du thidtre (Paris: Messidor/tditions sociales, 1987) at 113
(ddn6gation); and Ubersfeld, supra note 31 at 311-18.
38 See Pavis, supra note 37 at 127 (distanciation).
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C. Frame and Contents
The most important application of distancing to the theory of
mediation concerns the presence of the mediation process within the
frame of litigation. Let me explain first the effect in theatre of a frame
on its contents, and then show how this applies in mediation. At its most
basic level, theatre is framed by the real world in which it takes place,
but there are further enhancements of this framing process whenever a
play takes place within a play. Perhaps the most famous example is the
Murder of Gonzago, the play within Shakespeare's Hamlet.39 What are
the consequences of this procedure? The play within Hamlet, as altered
by Hamlet,40 refers back to the actual events of the King's murder by
having it re-enacted before Claudius, the murderer. The play within the
play is therefore more real than the framing play, which itself is less real
than the audience's reality. 41 There is a polarity shift brought about by
the insertion of a play within a play. The real world and the play are
positively and negatively charged, respectively, while the play within the
play, which purports to tell the truth, is positively charged. The internal
play, without the frame around it, would simply be a play with a negative
polarity. Due to its frame, it gains an appearance of truth that is greater
than that of the framing play. The meaning of the play changes
substantially due to the polarity shift.
An excellent illustration of this can be found using another play
by Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew. 42 As written, this play is
objectionable not only as it purports to show a husband's domination of
his wife, but her acceptance and finally her support for her own
oppression. However, if a frame is placed around the play-for
example, a man falling asleep in a prologue is awakened by his wife
Kate, "untamed," in the epilogue-the play can be presented as the
man's dream. The play, which is now within another play, takes on an
ironic character, using the same words to produce a different message
39 W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1I, Scene ii.
40 Seeibid. Act 1I, Scene ii.
41 See Ubersfeld, supra note 31 at 112; and G. Forestier, Le thitre dans le thifitre: str la scene
frangaise du XVIIe si&le (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1981) at 138-39, 177. L. Dillenbach, Le ricit
spiculaire: contribution a i'dtude de la mise en abyme (Paris: Editions du Scuil, 1977) writes generally
on the consequences of embedding one narrative within another when both narratives show marks
of similarity: the defining parameters are discussed at 18. See also E. Goffman, Frame Analysis: An
Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).
42 See L. Magnusson, "The Taming of the Shrew: Framing the Taming" in Performance
Program for The Taming of the Shrew (Stratford, Ont.: Stratford Festival, 1997) 5 at 5-7.
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for the audience. Through the imposition of the frame, which changes
the polarity and therefore alters the interpretation, the contents are no
longer objectionable.
How does this work for mediation? The real world in which the
dispute arises frames the litigation process, which is invoked to resolve
the conflict. Mediation, as shown in Fig. II, is itself framed by the
litigation. Applying semiotic theories of theatre, the real world dispute
is positively charged while the litigation it frames has a negative polarity.
The negative charge is consistent with the previous analysis of the
litigation model, whose artificiality denies, blocks, and imposes detours
on the delivery and reception of messages composed in opposing
discourses. Inside the semiotic square lies the more open field of the
mediation, where the communication and reception of messages is
enhanced. The mediation structure is further refined when a caucus is
called. This becomes a play within the play of mediation and it bears yet
another polarity to differentiate it from the mediation.43
Of what use is the construction of this multi-layered model? By
breaking down the dispute into layers of opposed polarities, the
mediator is able to employ each layer as a foil to the others, thereby
enhancing the interplay of distancing and denial. In effect, the mediator
sets up positions which are more attractive (caucus within mediation,
mediation within litigation) to render those that initially appear
attractive (litigation within the dispute rather than the insoluble dispute
itself) less so. It is a game of altering perceptions. The impossible, once
broken down into smaller tasks and rendered more attractive, becomes
possible. By gradually repolarizing and merging the inner portions of
the model with those surrounding them, like a series of shells, the
mediator is able to bring about a 'resolution of the dispute.4 4 The
43 The implications of the caucus for voluntary mediation will be discussed in Part V(C),
below.
44 This type of plotting of comedy is very common in the plays of Marivaux, particularly "Les
fausses confidences" in F. Deloffre, ed., Thifdtre complet de Marivaux, vol. 2 (Paris: Gamier fr~res,
1968) 339, which contains five embedded levels within the frame. Dubois, as mediator between the
two potential spouses, uses framing to help Dorante obtain as his wife Araminte, whom Dorante
loves but does not equal in wealth. Each of the interior plots work to change Araminte's perception
of Dorante so that by the end of the play, whose action occupies only one day, Araminte not only
admits a new-found love for Dorante, but agrees to marry him. The outcome is believable because
the changes in perception are accomplished as each level changes polarity when it is resolved into its
frame. The ultimate resolution occurs when the initial frame, the plan to trick Araminte, is revealed
to her by Dorante, but Araminte is nevertheless unwilling to part with him. For a detailed analysis
of the resolution of the many levels in this play, see G. Smith, "Mise en abyme, th6fitralit6,
distanciation et d6n6gation dans Lesfausses confidences ou comment rendre un amour improbable
vraisemblable" (1997) 3 Applied Semiotics/S6miotique appliqu6e 141.
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perceptual changes that accrue during the exploration of the various
levels are imported into the dispute-and ultimately into the real
world-by its resolution. The result in a successful mediation, according
to the Ontario model, is a mutually-acceptable resolution of the
dispute.45
The mediator employs various moves, or techniques, to promote
the success of the mediation. These moves are procedural, not
substantive. The mediator's removal from the substance of the dispute
gives the mediator greater freedom to implement procedural moves.46
As it is not possible to explore all of these moves within this article, I
have selected four of the most common to illustrate how mediators are
able to change the participants' perceptions during the course of the
mediation. These are: structuring the mediation, reframing the
participants' contributions, caucusing, and reality checking. Each of
these techniques will be explored in turn below.
V. MEDIATOR TECHNIQUES
John W. Cooley describes the mediator as a deceptive magician
tricking the participants into resolving their dispute. 47 Doubtless the
mediator is a performer who controls the process, employing techniques
within the mediation structure to alter perceptions and to assist the
participants towards the resolution of an intractable dispute. There is no
real magic in this, however, only the use of the pragmatics of
communication to alter perceptions of meaning. By pragmatics, I refer
to the context in which words are used.48 The meaning of a word
changes according to how, where, by whom, and to whom it is spoken.
An example is the exclamation "Help!": if sung, it could be recognized as
the Beatles' song, but if shouted from a burning building, it would signify
someone in need. Alternatively, if intoned with disgust or dismay, one
might merely be complaining about something. Placing any version of
this exclamation in a frame changes the perception of its meaning by
altering its reality. In mediation, the pragmatics of communication are
used as the major tool to change polarity, and therefore participant
4 5 See Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, r. 24.1.02.
46 See Moore, supra note 3 at 74-75.
4 7 See Cooley, supra note 5.
48 See A.J. Greimas & J. Courts, Simiotique: dictionnaire raisonni de la thiorie du langage
(Paris: Hachette, 1979) at 288 summarize the term pragmatique in its American usage as the
conditions of enunciation of the discourse. This is the meaning adopted here.
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perceptions, leading to the eventual depolarization of the dispute. The
first and most important tool of the mediator in this regard is the
structuring of the mediation.
A. Structuring
Mediators enter the dispute at a point when it is already highly
structured, as shown in Fig. I. Litigation has prescribed steps leading to
an adversarial trial, which is resolved by the judge's decision. The judge
arrives at his or her decision by weighing, within the context of the law
and rules of evidence, the conflicting stories created and presented by
counsel from the material facts of the dispute, and choosing the more
probable version.49 In contrast, the mediator has to create a structure
within which the parties will be able to move towards a single perception,
or story, and a joint resolution of the dispute. Structuring is the
narrativization of the dispute's resolution through mediation. From
divergent perceptions and a series of positions and legal rights, the
mediator must create a narrative path that will lead the parties to a
resolution of their dispute on interest-based principles. Although
mediators do not announce that they will do this, they nevertheless
structure the mediation to produce this result. This "mediation plan" is
initiated by the intervenorSO but it must seem to be the participants' own
creation and not one imposed upon them.51 This enhances their
acceptance of the story created in the narrative structure of the
mediation. 52
We are accustomed to the structure of stories and, without
necessarily being aware of the transitions or phases they use to reach
their conclusion, we can appreciate their typical narrative paths.
Semiotic analysis refers to four phases in narrative: manipulation,
49 See C.N. Candlin & Y. Maley, "Framing the Dispute" (1994) 7 Int'l J. Semiotics L. 75 at
92-93.
5 0 See Moore, supra note 3 at 141.
51 Ibid. at 227.
52 See Getting Disputes Resolved, supra note 29. See also C. Costantino & C. Sickles-
Merchant, Designing Conflict Management Systems: A Guide to Creating Productive and Healthy
Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996). Constantino and Sickles-Merchant deal with the
creation of conflict management systems. Both emphasize the greater acceptability to participants
of self-created procedures.
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competence, performance, and recognition.5 3 These four phases
comprise, respectively, the creation of the difficulty that sets the plot in
motion, the acquisition of the knowledge or skills needed to remedy the
problem, and the performance of the tasks required to reach the last
phase, which is the resolution of the initial difficulty. We will deal with
these in turn as they appear in the mediation narrative.
1. Manipulation
The manipulation phase has already occurred prior to the
mediation. The dispute itself is the reason the parties are seeking
mediation. There is probably an impasse, or dissatisfaction with the
litigation process as a means to resolve their problems. The parties are
therefore ready for the intervention of the mediator and will be
receptive to, and cooperative with, the mediator's techniques. In
preparation for mediation, the mediator learns from the parties the
origins and current status of the manipulation phase. From this basis,
the mediator is ready to structure the next three phases of the mediation
narrative.
2. Competence
The competence phase has three parts: mediators educate the
parties about the process, determine the best approach to assist the
parties, and set the appropriate systems in place. Before beginning the
exchange between the parties, mediators must first explain the process.
In particular, mediators must stress that they are only there to assist the
disputants in finding their own resolution. They must then explain how
mediation operates and what their roles are. The education step should
not only enhance the competence of the participants in the process, but
also their commitment to it.54 The mediation itself begins with the
participants speaking about their dispute. By observing the parties at the
outset of the mediation, intervenors can perfect their understanding of
the participants and the issues, and begin to create a plan for them to
follow in the performance phase. Even by setting the agenda in the
53 See Greimas & Courtrs, supra note 48 at 220 (manipulation), 52 (comp6tence), 270
(performance), and 320 (sanction); and Jackson, supra note 17 at 70, where the narrative structure is
applied to lav and the final phase is described as recognition.
54 See Moore, supra note 3 at 159-60.
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competence phase, the mediator will begin to achieve consensus by
refraining the parties' discourse to create joint perceptions. This is the
first step in establishing an agenda containing mutually compatible goals.
The completion of the competence phase will also serve as a first
example to the parties that some perceptions of the matters in dispute
might be satisfactory to both parties. This is in effect a dress rehearsal
for the performance phase. It gives confidence to the parties, reassuring
them that they can, in fact, agree on something and can therefore play
their roles in the mediation. 55 The parties will buy into a process that
they see has already started to work.56 The competence phase also
includes the setting of the stage, including props, costumes, and
appropriate spaces for the mediation.5 7 By the end of the competence
phase, the outline of the script is in place and the stage, props, and
actors are ready to put on their performance as guided by the director,
the mediator.
3. Performance
In the performance phase, the mediator employs moves to assist
the parties towards the final stage, the recognition of a joint or
congruent perception that allows for the resolution of the dispute. As
such, the performance stage contains the greatest usage of the other
three categories of mediator techniques which will be discussed in the
next three sections of this article: refraining, caucusing, and reality
checking. The agenda having been set, the more-or-less impromptu
performance begins. There is no fixed script, merely an outline of topics
to be examined and a series of techniques to be employed to avoid an
impasse. Just as the narrativization of mediation breaks the process
down into manageable and logical segments, so too the reduction of the
dispute to a series of agenda items in the competence phase reduces the
magnitude of the steps involved. This makes each step easier to
accomplish.
The steps will fall into two categories as set out in chapters ten
and eleven of Moore's text: "Uncovering Hidden Interests of the
55 Ibid. at 177-80.
56 Ibid at 159.
5 7 1bid. at 186-90. Moore discusses the importance of the mediator's clothing and the physical
arrangement of the space(s) used in the sessions, the use of visual aids, as well as the symbolic
importance of a party bringing an object in dispute to the mediation.
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Disputing Parties" and "Generating Options for Settlement."5 8 Both of
these activities gain from the Po nature of the mediation. Interests and
needs are more likely to be expressed in mediation than in court because
there is less risk in revealing them off the record. Likewise, the parties
generate options for settlement more creatively when they will not be
held to them by the force of a judgment. Nevertheless, if the parties
stumble in playing their roles, the mediator can intervene with
refraining, caucusing, and reality checking to assist them to continue the
mediation. Improvisation is required from the mediator and expected
from the participants. If the latter stick to their old script of positions
and rights, the mediation will never enter the interests circle of Fig. II.
Although it might still succeed, the mediation will be less likely to result
in a mutually acceptable settlement.
4. Recognition
The settlement is the recognition phase of the mediation. Not all
mediations result in settlement. As this is the explicit purpose of the
Ontario regulation, however, I will consider it to be the outcome of
successful mediation. In this final phase, the parties jointly consider the
options, and, through bargaining, these options are incorporated into an
agreement.5 9 The range of options available in the evaluative phase is
wider than those available through the entirely uncritical generation of
options. Accordingly, the possibility that appropriate solutions will be
found is greater.6 0 The process of bargaining and assessment are
facilitated by the changes in perception. This is true not only with regard
to the issues, which now share a unified discourse, but also with regard
to the parties, who now see each other not as contrary or contradictory,
but rather as cooperative. Final agreement can easily be reached when
the parties are sending and receiving their messages in the same
language.
The recognition phase marks the collapsing of the Po segment of
the mediation and its reintegration with the real world beyond the
dispute. In effect, the negatively-charged frame of the litigated dispute
melts away with the resolution and the positively-charged mediated
58 Ibid. at 231-66.
5 9 Ibid. at 269-317.
6 0 See De Bono, supra note 32 at 185-86.
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settlement blends back into the positively-charged real world in which
the settlement will take effect.
In summary, the narrative structure established by the mediator
leads towards the resolution of the dispute in stages which are
subdivided into processes and procedures. This is the mediator's first
technique to change perceptions of the dispute. The mediator makes it
appear smaller, more manageable, and therefore capable of resolution.
These phases also provide the parties with the opportunity to alter their
perceptions of one another gradually, in a non-binding forum. The
participants are empowered by this process as they gain competence to
perform their roles under the guidance of a skilled director. In the
narrative format, the process leads to a conclusion which flows logically
from the preceding phases. We will now examine three techniques used
by the mediator at various points in the process to ensure that it
proceeds along the narrative course to its conclusion.
B. Reframing
Within the context of the structured mediation, the mediator's
goal is to facilitate communication in order to help the parties to reach a
mutually acceptable resolution.61 To promote this outcome, the parties
must employ the same discourse. As I have indicated, this is not the case
in the model in Fig. I. Mediators must translate their separate
discourses to find their commonalities. They can then harmonize the
contrary and contradictory texts into one that is mutually acceptable.
The parties, however, must participate in this change so that it will not
simply be imposed upon them from the outside. Mediators therefore
encourage the parties to express themselves by inviting them to
participate, but also use questions to elicit material that will be useful in
fashioning the joint discourse. 62 Mediators' questions should elicit or
clarify information that can be used to locate the common interests of
the parties. They will also determine interests that the parties might
satisfy for one another at little cost to them. Mediators seek to make the
dialogue productive and inclusive rather than recriminative and divisive.
Their main tool in accomplishing this is reframing of the parties'
contributions.
Reframing is not simply repeating, paraphrasing, or
summarizing; these procedures do not change the character of what has
61 See Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, r. 24.1.02.
62 See Moore, supra note 3 at 210.
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been said. Refraining alters the language used to describe the dispute; it
"involves altering the participants' perceptions and current frames of the
behaviour, attitudes or issues in the dispute."63 Since altering
perceptions is critical to the creation of the joint discourse, refraining
acts as the essential bridge between the two discourses by highlighting
the common elements and creating a single perception of the dispute
from that shared point of view. Refraining can be of two kinds: a gist or
an upshot.64 These are defined by Christopher Candlin and Yon Maley
as follows:
In a gist, the substance of the response approximates to the preceding contribution, in the
sense that the meaning of the one is very close to that of the other: they share the same
truth conditions. ... [T]he gist response contains strong cohesive textual links with the
preceding utterance. Its orientation is typically past or past-to-present ....65
An upshot response, on the other hand, does not necessarily contain the same
propositional content as the preceding contribution; rather it is an inference by the
mediator from what has been said and assuch is open to challenge.6 6
The upshot synthesizes the present and has a present-to-future
orientation because it attempts to alter perceptions for the consideration
of the dispute following the point of refraining. A gist is more likely to
be accepted by the parties than an upshot, but it is generally the upshot
that is more important in forging a joint discourse. Gists generally
attempt to "eradicate negative attitudes and emotions and substitute
neutral, blame-free ones" or clarify discourse.67 Upshots generally try to
do more by cohesively thematizing 68 the discourse according to
categories susceptible to further exploration. Gists are therefore
passive, while upshots are active since they are more likely to move the
mediation forward.
When a gist or an upshot is used to alter perceptions of meaning,
the result is more than a simple depolarization of language. The upshot
is the intersection of two previously contrary discourses at which a joint
discourse comes into being. Once the upshot is accepted and the
intersection is perceived by the parties, a new basis of discussion arises
63 See Candlin & Maley, supra note 49 at 80.
64 Ibid. at 81.
65Ibid.
66 Ibid. at 82.
67 Ibid. at 87. See also Moore, supra note 3 at 222-23, where he describes this kind of
intervention as the depolarization of language.
68 See Candlin & Maley, supra note 49 at 87.
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along joint thematic lines. The mediator, ever conscious that the parties
must see the new discourse as their own creation, will ensure that the
upshot is carefully drawn to reflect the parties' comments, not the
mediator's own judgements.
Reframing, then, creates a joint discourse free from value-laden
terminology. Further, it is neutrally and jointly thematized so that the
problems and their solutions can be approached by the parties from the
same point of view. Separate discourses are shown to have common
underpinnings. With the harmonization of their perceptions, their
language, and the subjects to be discussed, the parties are in a position
to work together towards the common goal that is the resolution of the
dispute: the actual performance of the play. Should they become
blocked at this point, the mediator can use the technique of caucusing to
assist them.
C. Caucusing
Moore provides the following description of the caucus
technique:
In a caucus, the disputants are physically separated from each other and direct
communication between parties is intentionally restricted. Caucuses are initiated in
response either to external forces that affect the negotiators and the general conflict
situation or to problems arising from issues, events, or dynamics in the joint session.6 9
Caucuses are used to restrict direct communication between the
parties. This would appear to be contrary to the purpose of mediation to
facilitate communication, 70 but caucusing has a corollary affect that
enhances communication with the mediator. This type of
communication is possible due to the physical isolation of the caucus
from the mediation, giving it a team atmosphere. In the absence of the
other party and his or her counsel, the party in caucus will communicate
more openly with the mediator 71 and the mediator may communicate in
a less neutral way with the party.72
Why do these consequences flow from the caucus structure? The
caucus is, in fact, a play within a play, and the joint-session mediation
69 Moore, supra note 3 at 319 [footnotes omitted].
70 See Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, r. 24.1.02.
71 See Moore, supra note 3 at 319-20, which indicates that a number of the uses of caucus
depend upon this additional freedom.
72 Ibd. at 223, 323. See also Kolb, supra note 5 at 18-19.
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itself now serves as the frame for each caucus. Masks worn at the joint-
session may now be discarded under the protection of confidentiality. 73
Information concerning interests and needs that was not communicated
in the mediation, where it might display weakness, may be revealed more
freely to the mediator in caucus. In a play within a play, polarity changes
as it does between the play and its frame.74 The action of a play within a
play is unreal not only in the real world, but also in the framing play.
This produces, in the case of the caucus, a doubly positive polarity,
enhancing the hypothetical Po nature of the mediation by giving
confidentiality to what is said in caucus. What is said in mediation does
not count in litigation; what is said in caucus does not even count in the
mediation.
Each party's perception of the mediator also changes. The
mediator can be the special assistant to both sides without either of them
knowing that a mask has been donned by the mediator in caucus to get
them to cooperate more fully in the process.75 In addition, because the
other party is not present, the party in caucus believes that what is said
will not be heard by the other party. This is enhanced by the
confidentiality promised by the mediator. The caucus is the
environment that offers the most freedom in which to explore the
hypothetical, and therefore the richest source of ideas for the resolution
of the dispute.
It might at first seem odd that the area of mediation which
restricts communication the most would be the most productive in
advancing a resolution. This is really not surprising when the purposes
for which the mediator uses the caucus are examined. It must be
remembered that the mediator must caucus with both sides equally to
maintain the perception of fairness. There are therefore two parallel
examples of a play within a play, each with its own team atmosphere.
These are represented by quadrants 2 and 3 in Fig. II. The
communication is indirect, as it was in the litigation model shown in Fig.
I, passing from one team to the other through the common nexus of the
mediator. The mediator is the common element who convenes each
caucus and sponsors the proceedings with the knowledge of what has
transpired in the other caucus. Mediators are thus capable of steering
the discourse in each caucus along a similar path without revealing their
73 See Moore, supra note 3 at 170.
74 See Ubersfeld, supra note 31 at 112. See also Forestier, supra note 41.
75 See Moore, supra note 3.
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agenda, or the confidential information they have learned, to either
party.
As mediators shuttle between caucuses, their role as the source
of knowledge gains importance, and the caucuses become dependent
upon their formulations of the information passing back and forth
between the teams. This dependence extends to the teams' knowledge
of who is really speaking when the mediator speaks. The mediator can
assume authorship of any message and transmit it more easily in a
modalized or indirect form. For example, the mediator may learn in
caucus in quadrant 2 precisely what team A would offer to settle the
dispute. Rather than saying to team B that team A offers to settle the
matter on certain terms, the mediator can frame the information as
follows: "What if I could get you ... ?" or "Would an offer of ... be
reasonable?" Even if the settlement range of team A was communicated
in confidence, this method of modalizing the concept does not reveal the
source of the settlement proposal. Mediators can also take
responsibility for communicating such a proposal explicitly from an
offering team on the basis that they assume it as their own. The offering
team is therefore not bound by it as it would be by a direct offer and the
settlement range can safely be tested without commitment. 76
The most important feature of the caucus is its capacity to blur
the origins of the discourse. Neither party ever really knows the origin
of the mediator's suggestions. Indeed, as the mediator seems to be in
collusion with the party while the mediator caucus with them, the party
can only see the mediator as speaking for the party's own benefit. In
caucus, the mediator acquires enormous potential to alter the
perceptions of the parties in the mediation-and in the dispute
itself-by blurring the intention and origin of discourse. The
comparative polarities of each of the levels, starting on the caucus level
at double positive, working outwards to the single positive of joint-
session mediation, and finally to the negative polarity of the litigation,
camouflage the actual reduction of bi-partisan communication that
comes about in caucus.
In caucus, only the mediator acquires greater access to
communication. While the parties may feel more free to communicate
76 However, there is a drawback to caucusing. Just as mediators enjoy extended influence
over the exchange of information in caucuses, they lose the verification of what they learn from one
team by the other which would be available in joint session. A knowledgeable but dishonest party
can mislead the mediator in caucus where the latter is beyond the correcting influence of the other
party. A party could, in theory, exploit a credulous mediator in an active effort to take advantage of
the other party. The caucus is therefore a powerful but risky technique to employ, as it is both
enriched and endangered by the privacy which it provides.
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in caucus than in mediation, and communication in mediation is, in fact,
more free than in litigation, the parties and their counsel can only guess
at the origins and intention of the mediator's discourse. Since the
pragmatics of framing reach their deepest level in the caucus, it is the
most powerful tool in the mediator's armoury of techniques. The final
tool of the mediator that I will treat in this article is reality checking.
Since it occurs most often within a caucus, reality checking derives much
of its effectiveness from the pragmatics of the multiple frames that lie
around it.
D. Reality Checking
I will be dealing with two aspects of reality checking in this
section. The first relates to one party's perception of the other's
settlement range, and the second considers whether or not the potential
resolution should be accepted. In the first instance, the parties are asked
to put themselves in each other's position to consider the matter from
their point of view. In the second, the party considering resolution is
encouraged to do so in light of the alternative. Both strategies are
designed to encourage moderation and collaboration at the point of
resolution; the mediator "raise[s] the specter of impasse." 77 We will
look at each in turn.
When the mediator asks the parties to put themselves in the
other's place to consider a potential settlement, this is generally done in
caucus.78 Isolating one party from the other to perform this task is
essential-if the opposing party were present it would criticize the
proposal. The role-player would then feel obligated to retort by
supporting the proposal, thereby entrenching the position rather than
empathizing with the other party. The caucus of the party being asked
to role-play resembles the opposing caucus, in which the opposing party,
upon learning of the settlement proposal, would tell the mediator the
reasons why this would not be acceptable. The party who wishes to
make the settlement proposal is being asked in the reality check to
anticipate a reaction that has not occurred and will not occur if the
proposal is not made.
Because the role-playing party voices criticism during a reality
check, and not the other party, the former is more likely to see the
validity of the latter's arguments, and assume them as its own. The
7 7 Moore, supra note 3 at 276.
78 See ibid. at 275-76.
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parties have been asked to create yet another level of imbedded theatre,
a play within the play of the caucus, this time acting out a hypothetical
version of the other caucus within their own. The role-playing party is
likely to succeed, as it is effectively persuading itself. When the role-
playing party realizes that its proposal is unlikely to please the other
party, the former will likely change its mind. Without creating an
adversarial argument, then, the mediator is able to enlist the party's own
aid in altering its perception of the proposal, allowing it to check reality
without actually experiencing it or risking impasse.
Should the role be reversed and a recalcitrant party be unwilling
to accept a reasonable resolution, the mediator can once again use the
layers of the mediation model.7 9 Much effort has been expended to
create a positive polarity and atmosphere of cooperation through the
structuring of the mediation. The investment has been high and the
parties have no doubt felt that progress has been made. When a party
refuses to resolve the matter along reasonable lines, the mediator can
invoke the negative polarity of the litigation frame and the loss of all that
has been accomplished in the positive atmosphere by asking the party to
consider their BATNA, which would be a return to the negatively-
polarized litigation.80 This is a true reality check in that the litigation is
quite real in relation to the hypothetical world of the mediation. As the
party has been living in a more positive atmosphere for some time, the
rude awakening that the recollection of negatively-polarized litigation
would bring has a stronger effect than it would have had before
mediation. A party's perspective on the value of what the mediation has
created will be altered by the fear of losing the status quo of mediation
to the status quo ante of litigation. A party will likely alter its position
and accept the proposal to avoid the possibility of returning to litigation
and losing the gains made in mediation.
Reality checking involves juxtaposing the levels of polarity
created through the stages of mediation to foster new perspectives on
the dispute and the progress made in resolving it. Once again, it is a
question of distancing. In order to ensure that a party recognizes the
gains that have been made and the advantages of the mediation, the
mediator raises the spectre of the party's loss in returning to the pre-
mediation situation. By distancing a positive result within reach by
raising the possibility of a negative result, the mediator can alter the
perception of gains achieved by each party, encouraging them not to lose
79 Ibid. at 276.
8 0 IbiL at 277-78.
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them in reality. The gains can no longer be taken for granted; the
parties will strive to hold on to them once they perceive the
consequences of not doing so.
At this stage of the mediation, when resolution is near, the real
world beyond the litigation seems nearer for the parties and preferable
to a return to the litigation. The dispute is on the verge of being
resolved, dissolving the negatively charged litigation frame that
separates the positively charged mediation from the positively charged
real world outside the litigation. With an agreement to settle the
dispute, the litigation disappears, the caucuses merge with the mediated
settlement and the dispute once again merges back into the real world.
The narrative set out by the mediator from the beginning has come to .its
conclusion with a recognition of the agreement. The parties can go
home from the theatre without even crossing the litigation frame, as it
no longer exists.
VI. THE PRAGMATICS OF MANDATORY MEDIATION
Making mediation mandatory does not necessarily change its
pragmatics. In fact, there are three possible situations in our two-party
mediation model when it is made mandatory: both parties, one party
alone, or neither party are willing to mediate. In the first case, the
pragmatics of mediation should not change. Simply because a step is
mandatory, the parties' willingness to undertake it does not necessarily
change. They will likely behave in the same manner as they would in a
totally voluntary situation. The pragmatics of mandatory mediation for
willing parties would probably be the same as illustrated in Fig. II and as
discussed above. In fact, mandating mediation might encourage willing
parties to enter the process, as neither party would have to broach the
subject first-something that might otherwise be seen as an indication of
weakness. In the other two cases, however, the pragmatics would
change. Figure III, which representstwo unwilling parties, and Fig. IV,
which represents one unwilling and one willing party, show this change
in terms of the model in Fig. 11.81
Mediation is mandated through legislative, regulatory, or judicial
power, removing the choice not to engage in mediation and replacing it
with a requirement to do so. The difference appears in the placement of
the semiotic square in Fig. III and of its counterpart, the rectangle in
Fig. IV. In both cases, unwilling parties are indicated by the
81 See Appendix, Figs. III and IV, below.
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displacement of the square from the interior of the interests circle
outwards to the edge of the rights zone, where unwilling parties are
influenced by power. Although they are not forced to agree in substance
to a mediated settlement, they are forced to participate in the mediation
process. Interests are still included in the squares, but the mediation
model now must also include rights and reflect the influence of power.
Unwilling parties forced by law to participate in mediation, unlike
whole-hearted actors in the theatre of mediation, are not likely to
behave in the same way. Their attention will always be distracted by the
influence of power and rights which compel their performance. The
analysis that follows will demonstrate how their performance under
mandatory mediation would differ from the performance that has been
described for voluntary mediation.
Compared with litigation, voluntary mediation enhances
communication. This is demonstrated in Fig. II by the mediator's
presence at the centre of the circle of interests, in a position that is
theoretically neutral, equidistant from both parties, and which interrupts
the contradiction diagonals. If mediation is imposed, will the parties
perceive the mediator as occupying a similar position? Mediators can
attempt to convince the parties of this, but I believe they will be
perceived as coming from outside the square as the agent of power. They
therefore occupy an ambiguous position for unwilling parties. Will they
be able to enhance communication? If the parties perceive the mediator
as appropriating a central position to open communication, the
motivation for this will be in doubt for an unwilling party. These parties
will be less open to the enhanced communication if it results from power
and not from agreement. This suspicion will likely inhibit
communication between unwilling parties.
In order to get over this difficulty, the mediator must cover more
ground than in a voluntary mediation. As Fig. III shows, when both
parties are unwilling, the discourse must pass from the power zone
where it is imposed and through the rights circle to reach the interests
circle. The burden of distance.and level of persuasion required to
accomplish this complicates the mediator's task, forcing him or her to
become an advocate for the process. This detracts from the mediator's
impartiality; even if the mediator is impartial towards the parties, he or
she must become partial to a process which the parties reject. The
parties will be hostile to assistance if they perceive the mediator's
interests to be contrary or even contradictory to their own from the start
of the process. Even when only one party is unwilling, the mediator's
neutrality will suffer from this difference, as the mediator will have to
persuade the unwilling party to participate. The disparity here is shown
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in Fig. IV by the rectangle which pulls the mediator off centre in the
interests circle. Mediators must become an advocate of a process in
which only one party believes. Their neutral position is compromised
from the outset because they will be perceived by B as siding with A.
Voluntary mediation is hypothetical and non-binding. The Po
nature of mediation is compromised when parties are unwilling to
participate. For them the process appears very real as it blocks their
access to litigation. There are penalties for non-participation which have
an impact on the litigation.8 2 Although there is no penalty in the
Ontario rule for incomplete participation, the United States experience
shows that this is only a precedent or two away.8 3 The remedies of
blocking access to rights and the imposition of power for failure to
cooperate renders the mediation very real because failure to fully
participate could be disastrous. During their compulsory participation,
the unwilling parties will always be conscious of their compulsion.8 4
Consequently, they will never experience the kind of commitment to the
process which produces the theatrical effects of distancing and denial.
As the proceedings will always seem real, the unwilling parties will never
sufficiently lose themselves in their roles to reveal their needs and
interests, nor will they be prepared to imagine an interest-based
solution. They will be wary not to reveal something in the mediation
that might hurt them in the litigation. Unlike the Po nature of
mediation for willing parties, who see litigation only as a fall-back,
mediation does not count for unwilling parties, who fear that mediation
will only prejudice the main event-litigation. A process that does not
secure the commitment of the parties will not work effectively.
In voluntary mediation, the mediator is able to use the altered
polarity of mediation as a foil to encourage the parties to work towards a
solution in the dispute. Mediation is held up as being preferable to
litigation, which, in turn, is better than avoiding a resolution to the
dispute. However, where parties are unwilling to mediate, mediation is
not preferable to litigation. In fact, the polarity of mediation, which
82 See Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, r. 24.1.13(2) provides for the possibility of
suspending the non-complying party's participation in the lawsuit, or even dismissing its claim or
striking out its defence.
83 See L.V. Katz, "Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-
Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?" (1993) 1 J. Disp. Res. 1.
84 See R.A.B. Bush & J.P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation Responding to Conflict Through
Empowerment and Recognition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994) at 142-43. Bush and Folger
demonstrate, through an actual example of mediation which the parties had been directed to attend
by the court, that it is only the freedom to refuse to participate that promotes cooperation in a party
compelled to attend.
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appears to them as undesirable within litigation, is negative for unwilling
parties. They would prefer to return to litigation and are therefore less
likely to find an acceptable solution in mediation. Once the polarity of
mediation is perceived as being negative, anything contained in it will
also appear to be negatively charged, and therefore suspect, to the
unwilling parties. This will have a substantial effect on the mediator's
four techniques discussed in the analysis of voluntary mediation.
The mediator seeks to create a narrative structure for the
process that will resolve the dispute at the conclusion of the mediation.
In voluntary mediation, the parties are seeking a mediated solution and
are therefore quite willing to follow the mediator's narrative plan. This
plan involves the revelation and exploration of needs and interests which
would not come out in a rights-based procedure. Unwilling parties will
question the imposition of an agenda that requires them to reveal secret
interests and needs which could be interpreted as weaknesses or
vulnerabilities in the litigation. If these needs and interests are not
revealed and explored, the mediation will be blocked at the
reconciliation of rights, an area of the model included in mediation
whenever there are unwilling parties. This type of reconciliation is
believed to be more appropriately accomplished at trial, as trial
procedure is designed for that purpose and therefore contains the
appropriate procedural safeguards.8S5 Similarly, enforcement of the trial
verdict is also more appropriately accomplished at the boundary
between rights and power, the location of the unwilling parties in
mandatory mediation. Unwilling participants will not only be unwilling
to follow the mediator's narrative path, but are also unlikely to believe
that it will produce an enforceable, lasting result, as it would be far from
the rights and power that they see as the enforcers of agreements.
Reframing by the mediator locates the common points in the
parties' separate discourses, forging from them a neutral and common
discourse in which a resolution of the dispute can be found. Unwilling
parties will refuse to abandon their rights-based arguments and will
therefore refuse to accept the joint discourse. Where the mediator tries
to make discourse neutral in a gist, the parties will continue to attribute
the discourse to its speaker and impute a negative or hostile intention to
it. The unwilling parties will refuse to allow the separation of the people
from the problems.8 6 When an upshot is used, the forging of a joint and
common discourse will be rejected by the unwilling players who will
8 5 See articles cited supra note 8.
8 6 See Getting to Yes, supra note 30, c. 2.
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reimpose the initial sense of the discourse on the upshot, thereby
generating debate over the creation of the discourse itself. Rather than
accepting the thematization of the mediation and following the present-
to-future vector of the upshot, unwilling parties will continue to focus on
past conduct in which their rights are founded in order to support the
case that they are building for litigation. The attempt to create a
common, neutralized discourse will be seen as a denial of those rights
and will be resisted. Joint discourse is impossible where adversarial
argumentation is the response to gists and upshots. Without the forging
of a joint discourse to consider resolution of the dispute, the mediation
cannot pass from rights and power to interests.
The mediator may seek to isolate the unwilling parties in caucus
in order to create the joint discourse without their being aware of the
process and therefore resisting it before the return to joint session.
However, unwilling parties will view the caucus as oppressive rather than
liberating. As indicated above, the caucus merely doubles the unreal
negative polarity of the mediation. Unwilling parties will see the caucus
as pushing them even further from the assertion of their rights which is
their goal in the litigation and which was still, at least partially, possible
in joint session. Unwilling parties will not reveal confidential
information to the mediator because they distrust the mediator as an
agent of power, as represented in Fig. III, or as an agent of power in
league with the willing party, as represented in Fig. IV.
The semiotician Algirdas Greimas proposes that an actantial
analysis can be applied to all narrative constructs to reduce them to six
actants who perform the basic roles of the story.8 7 These roles can then
be set out syntactically in a single sentence that describes the narrative.
A sender provokes the subject to pursue an object, aided by helpers and
blocked by opponents with the intention that the results of the quest will
go to a sixth actant, the receiver. If we apply this grid to compare
mediations where parties are willing as opposed to unwilling, we can see
that the parties' perceptions of the mediator's actantial role change. By
willing parties, the mediator is seen as helping them as subjects to form
their own agreement, while by unwilling parties, the mediator is seen as
the subject pushing the parties towards agreement for their own benefit.
Through this usurpation of subjectivity, the parties are deprived of their
proper role as subjects seeking a resolution by and for themselves.
The perception of the mediator by unwilling parties can best be
expressed in the terms used in Joseph Stulberg's "how-to" guide for
87 A.J. Greimas, Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method, trans. D. McDowell, R.
Schleifer & A. Velie (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984) at 178ff.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
mediators.88 Stulberg discusses the same procedures as Moore, but in an
entirely different tone. Moore takes a helper approach, favouring terms
like "help" and "assist," and mitigators and modalizers, such as the
conditional mood, which indicate a possible course of conduct rather
than a prescription.8 9 Stulberg, by contrast, takes a mediator subjective
approach by giving his book the title Taking Charge/Managing Conflict
and by describing the mediator's role with the terms "force" and
"compel" from the very beginning of his analysis.90 He suggests that
mediators "capitalize on inconsistencies and vulnerabilities to develop a
framework for agreement."91 His use of acronyms as mnemonics for the
practice of mediation reinforces his conception of the mediator as
subject of the mediation. The admonition that "the mediator must seize
control of the discussion" is represented by the acronym "CNTRL" which
he applies to the structuring of the mediation.92 The mediator's role is
summarized by the acronym "BADGER," further enhancing the dominant
and persistent stance required by the subject mediator according to
Stulberg.93 Finally, the acronym for the caucus is "ESCAPE," a verb which
makes the mediator the subject.94
The caucus is the mediator's refuge when progress cannot be
obtained by controlling and badgering. The "A" in ESCAPE stands for
"attack recalcitrant party."9 5 In the case of unwilling parties,
recalcitrance will be a hallmark of their behaviour. After being
controlled and badgered, unwilling parties will feel imprisoned and
attacked in caucus if mediators seek to isolate them and compel them to
cooperate with the process. The response to attack is defence, not
cooperation. Each of the techniques employed by the mediator will
appear to the unwilling party as aggression, as Stulberg explicitly
describes them, and not as assistance, as they are described by Moore. It
is perception that matters, not the technique itself. From the unwilling
parties' point of view, if the technique is calculated to make them do
something which they do not want to do, it will be perceived as an attack,
8 8 See Stulberg, supra note 3.
89 See Moore, supra note 3.
90 Ibid. at 1.
91 Ibid
92 Ibid at 89.
93 Ibid at 58.
94 Ibid at 109.
95 Ibid
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provoking defensiveness, not cooperation. To unwilling parties, the
caucus-potentially the most effective element of voluntary
mediation-will seem like a trip to the interrogation chamber in the
prison of mediation, turning the caucus against the mediator and against
the mediation itself.
The mediator's final technique is reality checking, in which the
mediator plays polarities against one another to encourage settlement
when the alternative is not as attractive. Unwilling parties, however, find
the mediation less attractive than the alternative. The gains achieved by
unwilling parties to mediation up to this point in the process will likely
be few, due to the problems already cited, and they will appear less
attractive than proceeding with the litigation. The mediator has no real
foil to hold up to encourage settlement. Reality checking will not
encourage settlement, but rather remind the unwilling parties that the
litigation is their alternative and that the sooner they leave the
mediation, the sooner they can proceed with the litigation. Reality
checking as a means of encouraging the acceptance or offer of a
settlement at mediation will backfire when used on unwilling parties.
VII. CONCLUSION
To debate the opposition of mandatory and voluntary mediation
is to employ irreconcilable terms. In order to characterize their
opposition in terms that are more capable of reconciliation, the reasons
behind the difference in their application in practice must be revealed. It
is the question of the willingness of the parties to mediate which should
be explored. If mediation is forced upon unwilling parties, the likely
consequence will be the failure and disrepute of the process.
Considering its usefulness, this would be an unfortunate consequence.
The remedy would appear to be to encourage parties to willingly
participate. In order to do this, however, one would need to know why
parties are unwilling.96
96 Memorandun, supra note 1 at 8 describes the results of a survey conducted in the United
States. See also D. Stienstra & T.E. Willging, Alternatives to Litigation: Do They Have a Place in the
Federal District Courts? (Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center, 1995). In this report, a
comparison is made between opt-out and opt-in provisions for arbitration. The former were more
successful in procuring party participation in ADR. However, it would be interesting to know why
the parties who opted-out or failed to opt-in behaved as they did. Motivation is the key to answer
the question of a party's willingness to mediate. Learning precisely why parties are unwilling to
mediate is the first step in changing their minds.
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One could suggest a number of possibilities to explore in
empirical research of unwilling parties. The following list is clearly not
complete: Do the parties fear the unknown? Do they feel they will be
oppressed by the other party when the procedural safeguards of
litigation are taken away? Do they feel that they can win a complete
victory at trial, but might feel obligated to share at mediation? Do they
want to set a precedent for future court proceedings? Is the party they
are about to enter mediation with known to be difficult unless faced with
the threat of power created by judicial determination? Does the willing
party only wish to further delay the imposition of power on it by the
courts by engaging in mediation?
In creating a mandatory program, these issues and any other
sources of unwillingness must be addressed in order to assure success. A
good beginning would be an educational program for all lawyers that
would show them the benefits of mediation and how they can be
achieved. This knowledge could be passed along to the clients through
the distribution of materials not only describing the process, but showing
how it works and permitting the clients to participate in mock
mediations as role play exercises with their counsel.9 7 Kits containing
role play exercises, along with learning materials, could be supplemented
with independent coaching by persons skilled and knowledgeable in
mediation. The participants would gain the sense of security in the
process needed for them to reveal their needs and interests. How better
to learn about theatre than to perform it?
The mandatory mediation regulations could also provide for
flexibility on consent of the parties which would not necessarily eliminate
the requirement to mediate, but require its consideration and use,
subject to compelling contraindications, before trial. Exemptions are
already available in limited form and upon limited grounds in the
regulations, but only upon order of the court.98 This exemption
procedure must be liberally and knowledgeably interpreted to prevent
the process from falling into disrepute.
Finally, mandatory mediation itself should not be forced upon
unwilling parties. The attorney general of Ontario was reported in The
Globe and Mail as threatening to legislate mandatory mediation if the
legal establishment did not agree to it voluntarily.99 Ultimately, a
compromise was arranged, extending the Ottawa pilot project to require
9 7 See Grillo, supra note 8 at 1608.
98 See Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9 at 24.1.05
99 See Makin, supra note 2.
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all civil, non-family case managed actions to proceed to mediation, and
adding a Toronto element, where currently 25 per cent of actions are
subject to case management and to mandatory mediation.1 00 The
lessons of dispute resolution system design indicate that a process is
much more acceptable and widely used if it is proposed by the users
themselves.101 The Ontario government has used a power solution to
impose a process on potentially unwilling parties. As I have established
in the preceding analysis, the consequences of this approach to
mediation are detrimental to its success. The better approach would
have been to prove the usefulness of mediation to members of the legal
community so that they would willingly embrace it, and encourage their
clients to do likewise. One can only hope that, during the phase-in
period, the education of the legal community will continue, and
mediation will not be discredited as a mechanism of dispute resolution
before its efficacy has been established and recognized.
100 See Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, r. 24.1. The Ontario Mandatory Mediation
Program is expected to apply province-wide over the next few years.
101 See articles cited supra note 52 regarding the basic tenet of conflict management system
design that a self-created and adopted process is more acceptable and therefore more likely to be
used by the parties.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE I
COMMUNICATION IN LITIGATION
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FIGURE II
VOLUNTARY MEDIATION
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FIGURE IV
TEAM B UNWILLING
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